The EU2020 Strategy

The EU2020 Strategy, successor of the Lisbon Agenda, was adopted by the European Council on 17 June 2010. The Foundation for the Rights of Future Generations (FRFG), where I am working as a research associate, organised the launch conference for the EU2020 Strategy in Germany, together with the Representation of the European Commission in Germany. The conference took place in the “Europäisches Haus”, seat of the European Commission Representation directly at Pariser Platz, a few meters from the Brandenburger Tor.
A number of knowledgeable experts on the different aspects of the EU2020 Strategy, including representatives from the relevant Commission General Directorates, took part in three panel discussions. The audience consisted of over 100 stakeholders and interested citizens. The conference probably fulfilled its aim of sparking a public debate about the EU2020 Strategy, but on a personal side note I feel there are some more things to say about the successor of the Lisbon Agenda.

First of all, I think the failure of the Lisbon Agenda in general did not receive the attention it would have deserved. The world financial and economic crisis in a certain way was a welcome excuse for the European governments to bury the Agenda quickly and without too much noise. Since the crisis had made compliance with the aims set out in the Agenda impossible, the EU did not have to discuss the failure of the strategy. As a reminder: the proclaimed aim of the strategy was to make Europe the most competitive economic area in the world, something that the EU is probably less likely to achieve now than when the Lisbon Agenda was first adopted. This failure was barely discussed in public when the Lisbon Agenda neared its completion. But can a successful successor strategy to the Agenda be devised without discussing the failures? Yes and no.

Yes, because Europe has learned one important lesson from the Lisbon failure after all. The aims in the Lisbon Agenda were not clear, compliance was difficult to measure and there was no clear direction for Europe apart from lofty formulations. When the Lisbon Agenda was re-tuned a couple of years after its adoption trough the Council, including clear aims and agreements, some improvements became measurable. 

No, because Europe has still not moved away from a strategy striving to boost the same old indicators: economic growth as percentage of the GDP, research investments as percentage of the GDP, a maximum percentage of unemployment, a minimum percentage of university graduates. With the financial and economic crisis even the last European has lost his belief in these static figures. Instead of being presented a more sophisticated definition of growth, encompassing ‘smart’, ‘sustainable’ and ‘inclusive’ growth, that the EU introduced with its 2020 Strategy, people wanted to see a concept beyond mere growth and GDP.

And then there is the biggest no. After drawing a lot of vocal criticism from different European countries for the way a Bachelor/Master system introduced (some say imposed) on 27 different university systems with different academic traditions, through the Lisbon Agenda, the EU now seems to make the same mistake again. Again education seems to be the weakest link in the EU2020 Strategy as the Council has just decided to kick out a number of concrete education aims from the paper. Promoting ‘smart’ growth without a concept for education sounds like a challenging idea to say the least. It seems like the EU has forgotten that the innovation resources of Europe are the European students and professors, not patents miraculously appearing out of nowhere and education and research spending in percent of the GDP.

What are the reasons for this seemingly irrational misconception? Member States, particularly the German regional entities (Länder), jealously guard their competences in educational matters. The main areas in which German regions can uphold an independent policy are matters of internal security (police services) and education, and they are not ready to let Brussels have a say in one of the few areas in which a German regional government can sharpen its profile. In order to pacify the German ‘Länder’, the Council even adopted the sentence ‘These recommendations shall be fully in line with relevant Treaty provisions and EU rules and shall not alter Member States' competences, for example in areas such as education.'

The backtracking on tangible aims for the education sector in the EU2020 Strategy reveals the weaknesses of the EU system. The different political levels follow their own logics and have still not developed a sufficient understanding of the needs and priorities of the other levels. Try to explain a Finnish Commission official why the German government has to consult every step it takes in the education sector with 16 Länder, while taking shifting majorities in the second chamber and important elections in different regions into account. By the way, two commissions to reform Federalism in Germany have been founded in the last decade, with meagre results. It won’t be the last time that Europe witnesses a clash between the logics of regional and continental governance.

The Rome Statute Review Conference in Kampala

12 years ago, during the final session of the Rome Conference in June 1998, 120 states unexpectedly agreed to establish an International Criminal Court, the ICC with seat in The Hague. The final vote at the Rome Conference was the result of a long process that had started with the Nuremberg Military Trials against those most repsonsible for the Nazi atrocities committed during the Second World War. With the words of the prosecutor of the IG-Farben trial, Joshua DuBois, the idea behind the trials was that ‘It will not be possible to re-establish a healthy and peaceful European community by simply covering the dead with a shroud without any investigation.’

The idea that prosecuting atrocities committed in wars is in some way important for achieving peace after conflict is an idea that has been around ever since. But, for a long time it remained only an idea. The Cold War balance of power precluded any compromise on establishing an international organisation with the competence to judge crimes committed on an international level. But after the collapse of the Soviet Union this idea took a tangible shape and was finally passed through the Rome Statute, laying the foundation for the ICC in 1998. The 60 necessary ratifications of the Rome Statute to trigger its entry into force were gathered with exceptional speed, so the ICC could start its work in 2002 already.

Europe and Latin America are two of the main supporters of the court. As the ICC has no police force, it is heaily dependent on such state support and cooperation to do its work. The first eight years have seen a slow start of the court's work, with only three of thirteen prosecuted persons in custody and a polemic discussion about the courts role in the scope of an arrest warrant issued for the Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir.

From May 31 to June 11 2010 the court's work was assessed during the Rome Statute Review Conference in Kampala, the capital of Uganda. The Review Conference had been planned since the Rome Conference and apart from assessing the court's work so far, amendments to the Rome Statute were discussed in Kampala. The three major amendments that were discussed at the conference were the deletion of art. 124, giving the states parties to the treaty the right to exclude the ICC's jurisdiction on war crimes for seven years in their territory (the article was not deleted); the amendment of art. 8, penalising the use of weapons like poison, chemicals and hollow-tip projectiles in internal conflicts (the amendment was passed) and most importantly the definition of the crime of aggression.

So far the ICC has jurisdiciton over war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. The crime of aggression, meaning the penalisation of a breach of the UN Charter through an armed attack, was also included in the Rome Statute, but the ICC's jurisdiction for the crime was pending a clear definition. A definition that was now reached at the Kampala Conference. Unlike to many other international conferences, the results of the Kampala conference were not clear from the start. Usually results are agreed months before the actual starting date of the conference between the delegations of the states involved. Nevertheless, the definiton of the crime of aggression and the different trigger mechanisms discussed in Kampala remained contested until the last minute.

Many countries, especially the African states parties and the UNASUR, were in favour of implementing the crime of aggression. But one central question remained: Would the UN Security Council trigger the jurisdiction of the ICC or would a Chamber of the ICC decide whether the Office of the Prosecutor could start an investigation in a case. The UN Security Council already has the power to refer cases to the ICC and defer them for 12 months if the council deems it necessary. The referal of the situation in Darfur (Sudan) was the first time the UN Security Council made use of this powers and sparked a controversy in doing so.

Many African states and NGOs are claiming that the ICC is following purely political motivations and is a neo-colonialist institution since there are so far only active investigations in Africa. Even though the ICC is also conducting preliminary investigations in Afghanisatan, Gaza, Georgia and Colombia, the UN Security Council referal has strengthened this perception among many critics of the ICC.

Thus many countries were opposed to giving the UN Security Council a role in deciding whether the crime of aggression has been triggered in a particular case. Since the Council decisons are politically biased due to the veto powers of the five permanent members, a stronger UN Security Council role automatically means a more politicised court.

The compromise reached im Kampala allows state parties to decide whether the court may act on the crime of aggression. It can only do so, where either the UN Security Council refers a matter to the ICC or the alleged aggressor and victim states are parties to the ICC treaty though. How this will play out in practice remains to be seen in the future. Since the ICC jurisdiction for the crime of aggression will come into force in 2017 earliest, we will probably have to wait for a while to see the results.

A positive result of the conference was that the UN Security Council was not chosen as the only trigger for the crime of aggression, a step that would have further politicised the court. Europe and Latin America have been two of the main blocks securing that the ICC remains an independent institution governed by legal decisions and not by political calculations.

Implementig Intergenerational Justice

Last week, a colleague of mine, Marisa dos Reis, organised an international scientific conference on the legal implementation of the rights of future generations on the premises of the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation in Lisbon, Portugal. It was the perfect excuse to put the doctoral thesis beside for a moment and board a plane to (reputedly) warmer regions. We had some bad luck with the weather, but let me get to the point of this posting.

There are a host of contemporary problems that directly affect today's children and tomorrows yet unborn people. They include the global financial and economic crisis, the depletion of natural resources, environmental degradation, conflicts and most notably global climate change. Most of these problems were not heard of only a hundred years ago. Of course there have always been financial and economic crises (1920's!) but until recently humankind just didn't have the technological means to alter our environment in a way that shapes the fate of generations to come. Even if the old Greeks or the Holy Roman Empire would have wanted to, they could not have destroyed or severly damaged the environment in a way that would have affected generations born 100 years later. Even the forest clearance on the Iberian Peninsula, one of the most obvious historical examples for human influence on the environment, was done in the course of many generations. Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans, Portuguese and Spaniards cut the trees down in the course of the centuries to build their fleets, creating the arid climate on the peninsula we know today. But our generation can wipe out the world in a blink of the eye with nuclear weapons.

The problems are thus more pressing than ever. Yet, future generations are difficult to protect against damages through law. This is true even if they are caused knowingly through massive neglect as is undoubtedly the case with climate change. Unborn people do not have legal standing in the traditional sense. Additionally, laws stretching far into the future might clash with the principles of the rule of law, most notably the principle of clarity. But still, politicians on national and international levels always refer to future generations, their rights and the need to protect them. Are these only phrases? Future generations and their rights are named in the preambles of the UN Charter and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. They are mentioned by the Brundtland Commission, by the Stockholm Declaration on the Environment, by the Rio Declaration in 1992 and the UNESCO Decleration on the Responsibilities of the Present Generations towards Future Generations, to name just a few.

So, apart from visiting beautiful Lisbon, it's restaurants and bars and the marvelous towns in the vincinity (Cascais and Sintra a really worth a visit), there was a major question to deal with. The objective of the conference was to elaborate whether the numerous declarations of safeguarding the rights of future generations can be put into practice despite the problems they confront legal practitioners with. International speakers from the fields of philosophy and all sub-fields of law came together in Lisbon to discuss possible ways of implementing these rights on the national, European and international levels.
Many interesting approaches were intorduced at the conference. Emilie Gaillard Sebileau from the University of Orléans presented possibilities how the problem of rights of future people could be solved in French national law. Lucy Stone from UNICEF UK explained how safeguarding children's rights may be a feasible approach to protect the rights of future generations. Maja Göpel from the World Future Council presented a possibility of including the rights of future generations in the Lisbon Treaty of the EU and Sebastien Jodoin from the Centre for International Sustainable Development Law presented a draft code of criminal law addressing crimes against future generations. These speakers are of course just a small selection. The current Ombudsman for Future Generations of the Hungarian Parliament, Sandor Fülop, and the former Ombudsman from the Israeli Knesset, Schlomo Shoham, gave valuable insights into the work of institutions established to protect the interests of future generations. A full participant list of the conference can be found on the website.

The results of the conference will be documented in the scope of the Intergenerational Justice Review of the Foundation for the Rights of Future Generations. The journal is accessible freely and will be published by the beginning of July on the homepage of the foundation.

Thanks for reading!

Comment on the General Elections in the UK

These days I think back a lot to my stay in Leicester, a middle-sized town in the English East-Midlands, right around the corner of Nottingham and Robin Hood's famous Sherwood Forest. I stayed there in 2005/2006 for an Erasmus term. The elections for the German Bundestag took place just a couple of days before I caught my coach to England.

I vividly remember how many other Erasmus students and especially my English co-students in the different seminars asked us Germans what was going on in Germany and how it could be possible that the politicians were not able to form a government for weeks.
The social democrat chancellor of Germany, Gerhard Schröder, had triggered a snap election after losing a couple of important regions to the conservatives. Surprisingly the conservatives did not manage to achieve a clear victory despite the low popularity of the SPD government.

Chancellor Schroeder's appearance on election day has become famous for his psyched behaviour bordering on straight arrogance and many people were wondering if he was actually intoxicated. Long story short: Schroeder refused to step down to make a grand coalition under a chancellor Merkel possible and a political deadlock froze the Federal Republic for many weeks until Schroeder finally gave up and a CDU/SPD coalition could start its work.

In Leicester, we were talking a lot about the advantages and disadvantages of the British style first-past-the-post system and the German system of proportional representation at that time. Most people (including myself) considered it an advantage of the first-past-the-post system, that there was a very low danger of a hung parliament or a blockade like in Germany in 2005.

The General Elections in the UK on May 6th have now proven that this is not necessarily true. The majority of the British citizens are tired of Labour (at least according to 90% of all newspaper articles that I have read on the topic). But their voters are a more coherent group and have a higher regional concentration than those of the Tories or the LibDems, which means that with first-past-the-post even a hugely unpopular government has a chance to cling to power. Even though Labour is the main loser of the general elections, it is not clear yet if Tories and LibDems will be able to get to a coalition agreement, especially since David Cameron apparently does not even want to talk about the LibDems' main demand of reforming the electoral system of the UK.

Regardless of the outcome, the UK case illustrates a worrisome tendency: Not even a first-past-the-post system can apparently stop the decay of the large catch-all parties in Europe. In France, the political left is in hopeless disarray, much the same can be said for Italy. The big German parties are increasingly dependent on three-party coalitions in order to form a government in the German Länder, a trend that seems to be reinforced by the results of the elections in North Rhine-Westfalia today. Of course the LibDems benefited from the youthful charisma of their leader Nick Clegg and the frustration after the long Labour years. The only safe thing to say is that the negotiations about who will take power for the next couple of years in the UK will be interesting to watch. If the Tories fail to win the LibDems over, we could even witness Gordon Brown's comeback. The effects of this historical result on the first-past-the-post system is the second big question mark that will be answered within the next few days.

Argentina and the case of Baltasar Garzón

Baltasar Garzón is probably the internationally best known judge working on a national level. The Spanish judge was born in Torres de Albánchez in the Province of Jaén in Andalusia. After a side trip into politics in 1993, when he ran for the Spanish parliament on the list of the left PSOE party, he quickly dedicated himself to his career as a judge. Baltasar Garzón is currently the examining magistrate of the Juzgado Central de Instrucción No. 5 of Spain’s Central Criminal Court, the Audiencia Nacional. In this position he is in charge of judging Spain’s most important criminal cases.

Baltasar Garzón is considered one of the most active judges in using the principle of universal law and was one of the driving forces that constituted Spain's role as the nation with one of the widest interpretations of universal jurisdiction worldwide*. He is probably best known for issuing an international arrest warrant against the former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet who had previously profited from a life-long amnesty as a member of the Chilean senate. The arrest warrant was eventually enforced by the United Kingdom but extradition to Spain was denied on health grounds.

Baltasar Garzón also tried to lift Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi's immunity from prosecution at the Council of Europe in April 2001 and repeatedly expressed a desire to investigate the involvement of the former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in the killings of leftist opposition figures in the Southern Cone in 1975, known as Operation Condor. Additionally he opened investigations on systematic torture in the cases of former prisoners at the US military prison in Guantanamo Bay.
It is rather obvious that Garzón has a knack for taking up spectacular and sensational cases, an approach that is not beyond criticism for a judge who should act on purely legal considerations. Nevertheless his actions in strengthening universal law highlighted cases of impunity and furthered the notion of the primacy of the rule of law worldwide.

But Baltasar Garzón is also an inconvenient judge on the national level. With his investigations into the party financing of the Spanish Conservative Party, the Partido Popular (PP), and against a PSOE minister involved in creating death squads to fight the ETA terrorist organisation between 1983 and 1987, he has made himself enemies in both political camps. This fact is currently backfiring on him as he has come under fire for allegedly exceeding his authorities in the scope of an investigation.

Baltasar Garzón started investigating the crimes of the Franco regime during the dictatorship even though an amnesty was democratically passed in 1977. Three organisations, including the radical right wing party Falange, have sued him for perversion of justice. The Spanish High Court has opened the trial against him and the administrative body of the Spanish judges will decide on Thursday if Garzón will be stripped from his office. Scores of Spanish victim's and civil society organisations, including film stars and directors like Pedro Almódovar, are protesting against the proceedings.

It is an obvious scandal that right-wing parties can not only fend off investigations into crimes committed during the dictatorship but even put the judges investigating these crimes under pressure. Internationally the acceptance for amnesties is rapidly diminishing, a development emphasized by the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Rome Statute, establishing the ICC, has already been signed by over 110 states with obvious repercussions on the validity of amnesties covering war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocides. Passing the 1977 amnesty would be all but impossible nowadays. An amnesty could only be possible if concrete steps to investigate the crimes are taken and the truth is brought into the open. Those directly responsible for the crimes could not completely evade punishment and the victim's rights would receive considerably more attention today.

In an ironical twist of history, the Argentinean attorney Carlos Slepoy has now declared that he will apply for taking up criminal proceedings in connection to crimes against humanity or even genocide committed by the Franco regime. Ironically, Garzón himself had started investigations against Argentinean Junta leaders in the past, thus contributing to their amnesty being revoked. Now it is possible that we will witness the first case in which Argentina applies the principle of universal jurisdiction itself, another indicator that the relation between Europe and Latin America is changing. Latin America's democracies are sufficiently self-confident today to teach European states a lesson in respecting victim's rights, a thought that will surely cost some Europeans to adapt to.

A victim's organisation has started a collection of signatures against the indictment of Baltasar Garzón at http://www.afeco.org/

*Even though the use of universal jurisdiction has increasingly been limited due to the political fallout of the cases. The criteria for the cases having a direct relevancy for Spain have been strengthened, reason for the failure of the attempt to start investigations into the Operation Cast Lead of the Israeli Defence Force in Gaza by the end of 2008 in Spain.

What Europe and Latin America can learn from each other

In 2010 many Latin American states are celebrating their 200 years of independence anniversaries, called 'bicentenario' in Spanish. Chile, Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia are preparing their respective celebrations with growing enthusiasm. In Mexico there will be a soccer tournament to celebrate independence and Colombia sports its own 'bicentenario' hymn. The celebrations also mark a point in history at which the relations between Latin America and Europe were transformed in a decisive way. Simon Bolívar, Francisco de Miranda in Venezuela and Miguel Hidalgo in Mexico, to name a few, all played their part in liberating Latin America from Spanish domination from 1810 onwards. Nevertheless the independence wars were mainly an elite revolution fought by the influential criollos (people of mixed Spanish and indigenous descent) for their own liberty. They did not bring liberty to the indigenous people of Latin America who were still considered of lower social status by the criollos.
The accumulation of independence anniversaries in 2010 is a welcome opportunity to have a look at how Europe and Latin America have fared since the former Spanish colonies gained their right to self-determination.

Europe has witnessed a fundamental transformation during the last 200 years. The ideas of the French revolution were still fresh and the consecutive waves of change were still rippling the political framework of the 'old continent'. The reality of Europe was still dominated by powerful nation states engaged in antagonistic relations and competing for influence within and outside of Europe. Balance of power politics and changing allegiances, accompanied by regular outbursts of war, shaped the relations between Europe's nations.

Today, the continent has grown together politically and economically in the scope of the European Communities. Only small patches of the continent remain outside the Union, either out of their own choice (Switzerland, Norway) or because they are not yet fulfilling the criteria for acceptance as Member States. While non-EU states like Switzerland and Norway are politically and economically integrated despite lacking membership, states like Croatia and Serbia are on their way towards accession.
But political crises like the fallout of the financial and economic crisis show that the cultural differences between European countries remain and sometimes lead to quarrels and misunderstandings. Germans are complaining about the mentality of sloppy accounting of southern Member States like Greece and do not want to pay other people's bills. France is pointing at German selfishness when addressing the growth of the German economy bought at the cost of wage sacrifice and the competitiveness of neighbouring economies.
Every European who has lived for some time in another Member State or has family in another European country has made his experiences with cultural differences. Most of the time these encounters are enriching experiences, opening our eyes for different cultural contexts. But sometimes it is frightening to see how easy it is to be misunderstood when out of one's own cultural context. Add to this mix of European cultures the cultures of the migrant groups living in many European cities and you have a huge variety of different cultural backgrounds crammed together on a relatively small continent. It is probably not surprising that the cultural cohabitation between Europeans of different nationality and migrants from different origins does still not run smoothly.

Latin America on the other hand is still in the process of economical and political cohesion. The difficulties in covering the large distances between Latin American states (intracontinental plane flights are not affordable for a large portion of the population) and the pervasiveness of political conflicts between them are a clear indicator for this. Even though Latin American integration is advancing, there is still a very long way to go. Culturally, on the other hand, Latin America is a remarkable example for a unique continent-wide culture including African, European and Latin American roots. Nobody who has read books by authors from different Latin American countries can deny the closeness in style and the same cultural roots of, say, Colombia's Gabriel García Marquez and Uruguay's Juan Carlos Onetti. The continent shares a common Iberian linguistic heritage, defying the trend of accepting English as the global 'lingua franca'. And the mix of cultures to be found on the continent is a herald of things to come with the advancing globalization. The strength Latin America can draw from its rich cultural heritage in the globalized world of tomorrow is considerable.

On a shrinking planet, the political, economical and cultural cohesion of regions is key for ensuring their influence on a global scale. While Europe has advanced on the political and economical level, it has a lot to learn from cultural cohesion in Latin America. The mix of cultures that respects African, European and indigenous roots could be a blueprint for a culturally unified Europe that does not overwrite its unique and diverse cultures by some kind of standardized culture, but produces a synthesis that is larger than the sum of it's parts. Growing together on a cultural level does not imply to lose the respect for the cultural roots of the different Member States. Latin America is the living example for this.

The Falkland/Malvinas case

The United Kingdom and Argentine are upholding a conflict about the status of a small group of islands in the South Atlantic since decades. Even the name of the islands, consisting of two large and several smaller ones, is contested. The British name is Falkland Islands while they are called las Malvinas in Argentine. Both the British and the Argentinian government claim the islands to be part of their territory. While Argentine sees them as an integral part of their Tierra del Fuego Province, Britain maintains their status as British dependent territory. The Argentinian claim is even included in transitional provisions of its constitution.

The contested islands look back at a changing history of rivaling claims. The British first landed on the islands in 1690. France claimed de facto control over the islands by founding a settlement in 1764. The 1713 Treaty of Utrecht conceded control of the islands to Spain, which lead to the expulsion of French and British settlers from the islands by 1770. The Argentinians first claimed sovereignity over the islands in 1820 after it's independence from Spain. Argentina was still known as the United Provinces of the River Plate Since at that time. Since 1833 there is a fully fledged British colony on the islands. The population of the islands sees itself as British, but Argentine declines their claims for self-determination, stating that the original (Argentinian) population has been expelled by British colonists who thus do not have a genuine right to self-determination.

The conflicting claims from Britain and Argentine first led to real tensions during the Falklands War / Guerra de las Malvinas in 1982. The Argentinian military junta used the claim for the islands as a vent for the growing discontent of the population with the military government. These claims quickly culminated in an Argentinian invasion of the islands in 1982. Contrary to Argentinian expectations, the United Kingdom under Margret Thatcher reacted quickly and sent a naval force to retake the islands. The resulting conflict lasted 76 days and cost the lives of 1000 soldiers and a handful of civilians and ended with the British reposession of the islands. The loss of the islands led to the toppling of the military junta that had originally triggered the conflict to consolidate it's rule.

Argentinian claims for the islands have never since been secluded and have been renewed in 1994, 2009 and 2010. The recent discovery of oil in the sea around the islands has led to new tensions in February 2010. While British companies began preparing the extraction of the oil, supposed to start in 2011, Argentinian President Christina Kirchner declared that Argentine is taking control of all shipping between its coast and the islands in order to hamper the exploitation of the oil field. While there are voices in the international (especially the British) press, saying that President Kirchner is using the Argentinian claim for the islands as a vent for discontent with her government, just like the military junta in 1982, Argentinians are taking the claims as a serious issue of national identity.

A suitable first step to defuse the conflict would be an agreement between the British and Argentinian governments to exploit the oil fields in a joint operation and share the profits. Economical cooperation could then help to unravel the highly symbolical issues that have proctracted the conflict. A conflict between two of the largest and most important states of Europe and Latin America can be a monkey wrench thrown into the process of deeper cooperation between the two continents and it is questionable if a group of remote islands are really worth the price to pay.

A sign on the Argentinian side of its border with Brazil,
proclaiming the Argentinian claim for the islands