Populism on the Rise

So, after a rather long summer break of beach vacations and the following struggle to keep up with the workload I finally get around to write a new post. Actually a couple of interesting things have happened during the summer months, but one topic has been hot across a variety of different countries: immigration and xenophobia.

It seems that looking for scapegoats remains a strong human inclination in hard times. Even though the world is slowly recovering from the financial and economic crisis, people in many western countries are still jealously guarding the economic recovery against perceived threats from the outside.

Already in spring the US State of Arizona passed the harshest anti-immigration bill of the US. After scores of illegal immigrants from Latin American and Middle American states had upheld economic growth in the US by working for wages no American would move a finger for, these illegal immigrants had become unwanted competition on the labour market. The bill introduced a duty to have immigration papers ready 24/7 and allowed police officers to check the immigration status of people if there were 'grounds for suspicion'. The Obama Administration has sued in Supreme Court against the bill.

In France, President Sarkozy has decided to deport illegal Roma living in camps in France in a populist move to appeal to right wing voters who want illegal immigrants out, especially during times of economic strife. This initiative has met harsh criticism by European countries and the European Commission. A trial at the EU Court is a possible consequence as the illegal Roma are Romanians and thus EU citizens.
Still, the initiative by Sarkozy does not only meet disapproval. When I was in Spain, a survey about Sarkozy's deportation plans was conducted in the scope of a political talk show there. Over 70 per-cent of the Spaniards calling in demanded that their President Zapatero should do the same thing in Spain and 'get rid' of the illegal immigrants in Spain. Yet, Spaniards are at the same time again starting to migrate towards France as seasonal workers during harvest time. Somethign Spaniards did not have to due in a generation as the economic boom boosted living standards across the Iberian peninsula. Due to economic strains they are now again moving to other European countries in the search for work, so one expects that they would have more sympathy for the situation of migrants.

In Germany, the former Secretary of Finance of Berlin and current board member of the Federal Bank Thilo Sarrazin has published a book about the unwillingness of immigrants to integrate in Germany, and has attributed some problems with integration to genetic causes. A concept frighteningly close to 20th century racism. Nevertheless he has also received public approval and attention.

Last but not least the US have mourned the 9th anniversary of the terror attacks of September 11th 2001 amidst outbreaks of xenophobia and distrust towards their Muslim minority. Taking into consideration that the US have a history of immigrations by people fleeing from religious prosecution and that al-Qaeda explicitly planned to unleash a war between Islam and the West, these developments are worrisome indeed.

These developments are a consequence of our everyday approach towards migration and integration. As long as we are profiting from it, or we can just forget about it, we do not deal with the problems migration brings with it. Integration is a challenge for both the recipient society and for the immigrants due to a number of reasons. The book by Thilo Sarrazin has the virtue of at least addressing this topic and illuminating the problems migrants also tend to bring with them. Yet, migration should not only be a topic to vent steam in bad times. There should be a genuine and permanent effort to address the problems of immigrations on both sides and a strive for searching better ways of living together in the future. It is clear that immigration is the future in a globalised world, so we better start thinking of ways to make integration work despite economic strains.

Thilo Sarrazin

Germany and Europe - a love gone sour?

Together France and Germany have been seen as the heartland and motor of Europe for decades. The age-old animosity between the two neighbours had erupted in the scope of two World Wars in the 20th century. When the European integration began through the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community, thoughts were still mainly on avoiding another outbreak of the enmity. Very few people would have thought that the countries would become the driving tandem of the EU by the end of the 20th century.

Yet, something has changed since the world financial and economic crisis starting in late 2008. France has criticised Germany for its over-dependence on exports, claiming that the German model works at the expense of other EU Member States. On the other side, Angela Merkel blocked French President Sarkozy's plans for a joint EU approach towards economic governance. (I had posted some remarks on the lack of such a joint approach back in February). But the rift is not only widening between the European tandem. Also the rest of Europe is eying Germany with increasing suspicion.

The main reason for the tensions is Germany's slow approval of financial support for Greece and the European emergency fund to stabilise the Euro-zone. Media in other European countries has increasingly written about Germany 'showing its teeth' and pursuing and increasingly national agenda. Newspaper commentaries, like George Soros' commentary in last weeks Die Zeit, claim that Germany is trying to impose its model of financial austerity on the other Member States. In the German population on the other hand there are fears that Germany will be pulled back into the financial crisis by other, weaker EU Member States or that they will be deprived of the fruits of their hard work through the failures of irresponsible governments in other Member States.

What are the reasons for these widening rifts between Germany and many of its European neighbours? I argue that there is a fundamental misunderstanding about the way Germany sees itself and is seen by its neighbours. Germans are traditionally very skeptical about the economic development and when assessing their overall situation. Even though Germany weathered the financial and economic crisis well, and came out on top, people are worrying about the chaotic situation in the German Federal Government, they are afraid that the model of temporary employment that brought Germany through the crisis might collapse or backfire; they are afraid that they could be sucked in to a new financial crisis by Greek, Spain, Ireland and other countries struggling for a financial equilibrium.

The EU neighbours on the other hand see Germany as THE economic power on the continent. And they see that the economic dominance has grown even stronger since Germany weathered the crisis comparatively well. Additionally, our neighbours are projecting their notions of nationhood on Germany. Pursuing national interests in certain situations is perfectly normal for most states, even within the EU. So other EU Member states see Germany's show of force, that is born out of fear, as a claim of leadership or even dominance within the EU. Germans on the other hand do not have a 'normal' notion of nationhood since World War II. The view that the Holocaust and World War II were a consequence of Germany's national ambitions is a mainstream view over here. As a consequence, Germany has to follow national interests much more implicitly than its neighbours. Only when Germans see their economic wealth at stake, a centrepiece of Germany's post-war self-image, stronger moves are admissible. But in Germany this is seen as self defence, not as a bid for power.

Only recently, inter alia through the World Cup 2006 celebrations in Germany, a more relaxed relationship with nationhood has been emerging in Germany. Germans were seen as a friendly and hospitable nation during the World Cup 2006, a fact that was widely reflected in national press coverage and in which Germans took a lot of pride. It was seen as a way to find a new approach towards nationhood, completely different from 20th century national(social)ism. Germans see themselves, and want to be seen, as a friendly nation (just have a look at the World Cup logo Germany chose below). Reliable, friendly and unoffending. So they do not realise how their economic policies are being read by their neighbours. Germany is not conscious of its increasing power within the EU and is thus not using this power in a responsible way and with respect for the fears of its neighbours that see an increasing economic dominance of Germany looming over their heads.

Germany still has to learn that power comes with responsibility. This responsibility has to be assumed actively. It is not possible to act as if the increase of German economic power had not taken place, but this is exactly what Germany is doing. Germans are saying 'we just wanna be friends' while they are defending their newly won economic power position. In order to understand the background of this misunderstanding, Germany and its neighbours have to learn to see things through each other's eyes. Apparently, 60 years of integration have not been enough to reach this level of mutual understanding.

Peace through integration - EU and UNASUR

With UNASUR, Latin America is following the example of the EU, trying to establish a zone of stability, economic prosperity and peace on the South American continent. But why has the European Union become a textbook example for peace while tensions still abound in Latin America?

Ensuring a long and stable peace on a formerly war ravaged continent is probably the most impressive achievement of the European Union to date. Even though peace has become the natural condition for a whole generation of Europeans, it was far from self-evident that a continent like Europe could achieve this in mere decades.

The situation along many borders in Latin America on the other hand remain tense. Some days ago, Hugo Chávez declared at a graduation ceremony of sports students that he would sever all diplomatic ties with Colombia. It was his answer to allegations of President Uribe of Colombia, who had claimed that Venezuela is supporting the FARC guerilla. Colombia is waging a decades old counterinsurgency campaign against the FARC. Information that FARC has used bases in Venezuela several years ago are well known, and so far it is unclear whether the proof presented by Colombia is new, or just documents the old facts.

This new row about alleged FARC support is a new episode in the animosities between Venezuela and Colombia that became heated when the US boosted its military cooperation with Colombia and got permission to use several army bases on Colombian territory. Even though a war over these disagreements still seems very unlikely, it is worrying that a solution to the problem was not found in earlier stages. That both states are members of UNASUR, documents that Latin American integration has still not managed to fully display the stabilising effects that the European Union project had in Europe.

Why is this the case? Of course there were also political conflicts between European states during the European integration, for example regarding the accession of the United Kingdom disputed between France and Germany in the sixties. France took up an 'empty chair policy', refusing to take part in European Council meetings as long as a solution was not found, effectively blocking the EC at that time. Even many status questions between the sates remained unsolved, including contested borders. Still, cooperation never suffered significantly.

The hegemonic interests of the US and its meddling in Latin American politics could be an explanation for the stuttering start of UNASUR. After all, the relations to the US is one of the main divisive issues in Latin America. Europe had to fend off the influence of a regional hegemon, too, namely the USSR. The Iron Curtain documented the division of Europe regarding the role of the Soviet Union. Yet, the division did not run between the governments of the EU member states. The external factor of US foreign policy thus definetly figures into the less than perfect security situation in Latin America.

Still, ohter factors have a bigger impact, namely the legacy of self-sufficient armed groups in many parts of Latin America. Without the FARC threat Colombia would be less tempted to cooperate with the US military in spite of security concerns voiced by its neighbours, and the latest episode of the quarrel would not have occured at all. Armed groups in a region are an invitation to proxy warfare, used to pressure other governments by supporting its internal enemies. Additionally, these groups do not respect borders. A Colombian air raid on FARC bases on the Ecuadorian side of the border sparked tensions between Colombia and Ecuador several months ago. When these groups cross borders freely and provoke reactions, suspicion about the neighbour's involvement naturally arise.

In Europe, peace was a by-product of economic integration. The economies of the European states became intertwined to a degree that no one could start to manufacture arms without the other one knowing. Distrust was diminished considerably which ultimately led to further reapproachment and cooperation. Transparency could also be a successful recipe for guaranteeing more stability in Latin America, but it would not be a final solution. The threat of armed non-state actors has to be confronted as they will be a lasting source of instability in the region. Thus, cooperation in military matters will be necessary to stabilise the security situation in Latin America.

Unfortunately, cooperation in issues of security are not as easy to achieve as economic cooperations. They presuppose a certain level of trust as military cooperation is not always as clearly a positive-sum cooperation as economic coordination. The challenges in Latin America are thus greater than they were in Europe. The politicians will have to actively work on building trust and transparency, in order to then move forward to military cooperation. The self-sustaining process of reapproachment and trust building in Europe was in some ways a lucky coincidence. Thus, the individual responsibility of politicians in Latin America is higher. Both Uribe and Chávez did not live up to this responsibility in their crisis management. One can only hope that Colombian President elect Santos will push his reconciliation efforts forward that he started by inviting Chávez to his inauguration ceremony.

The EU2020 Strategy

The EU2020 Strategy, successor of the Lisbon Agenda, was adopted by the European Council on 17 June 2010. The Foundation for the Rights of Future Generations (FRFG), where I am working as a research associate, organised the launch conference for the EU2020 Strategy in Germany, together with the Representation of the European Commission in Germany. The conference took place in the “Europäisches Haus”, seat of the European Commission Representation directly at Pariser Platz, a few meters from the Brandenburger Tor.
A number of knowledgeable experts on the different aspects of the EU2020 Strategy, including representatives from the relevant Commission General Directorates, took part in three panel discussions. The audience consisted of over 100 stakeholders and interested citizens. The conference probably fulfilled its aim of sparking a public debate about the EU2020 Strategy, but on a personal side note I feel there are some more things to say about the successor of the Lisbon Agenda.

First of all, I think the failure of the Lisbon Agenda in general did not receive the attention it would have deserved. The world financial and economic crisis in a certain way was a welcome excuse for the European governments to bury the Agenda quickly and without too much noise. Since the crisis had made compliance with the aims set out in the Agenda impossible, the EU did not have to discuss the failure of the strategy. As a reminder: the proclaimed aim of the strategy was to make Europe the most competitive economic area in the world, something that the EU is probably less likely to achieve now than when the Lisbon Agenda was first adopted. This failure was barely discussed in public when the Lisbon Agenda neared its completion. But can a successful successor strategy to the Agenda be devised without discussing the failures? Yes and no.

Yes, because Europe has learned one important lesson from the Lisbon failure after all. The aims in the Lisbon Agenda were not clear, compliance was difficult to measure and there was no clear direction for Europe apart from lofty formulations. When the Lisbon Agenda was re-tuned a couple of years after its adoption trough the Council, including clear aims and agreements, some improvements became measurable. 

No, because Europe has still not moved away from a strategy striving to boost the same old indicators: economic growth as percentage of the GDP, research investments as percentage of the GDP, a maximum percentage of unemployment, a minimum percentage of university graduates. With the financial and economic crisis even the last European has lost his belief in these static figures. Instead of being presented a more sophisticated definition of growth, encompassing ‘smart’, ‘sustainable’ and ‘inclusive’ growth, that the EU introduced with its 2020 Strategy, people wanted to see a concept beyond mere growth and GDP.

And then there is the biggest no. After drawing a lot of vocal criticism from different European countries for the way a Bachelor/Master system introduced (some say imposed) on 27 different university systems with different academic traditions, through the Lisbon Agenda, the EU now seems to make the same mistake again. Again education seems to be the weakest link in the EU2020 Strategy as the Council has just decided to kick out a number of concrete education aims from the paper. Promoting ‘smart’ growth without a concept for education sounds like a challenging idea to say the least. It seems like the EU has forgotten that the innovation resources of Europe are the European students and professors, not patents miraculously appearing out of nowhere and education and research spending in percent of the GDP.

What are the reasons for this seemingly irrational misconception? Member States, particularly the German regional entities (Länder), jealously guard their competences in educational matters. The main areas in which German regions can uphold an independent policy are matters of internal security (police services) and education, and they are not ready to let Brussels have a say in one of the few areas in which a German regional government can sharpen its profile. In order to pacify the German ‘Länder’, the Council even adopted the sentence ‘These recommendations shall be fully in line with relevant Treaty provisions and EU rules and shall not alter Member States' competences, for example in areas such as education.'

The backtracking on tangible aims for the education sector in the EU2020 Strategy reveals the weaknesses of the EU system. The different political levels follow their own logics and have still not developed a sufficient understanding of the needs and priorities of the other levels. Try to explain a Finnish Commission official why the German government has to consult every step it takes in the education sector with 16 Länder, while taking shifting majorities in the second chamber and important elections in different regions into account. By the way, two commissions to reform Federalism in Germany have been founded in the last decade, with meagre results. It won’t be the last time that Europe witnesses a clash between the logics of regional and continental governance.

The Rome Statute Review Conference in Kampala

12 years ago, during the final session of the Rome Conference in June 1998, 120 states unexpectedly agreed to establish an International Criminal Court, the ICC with seat in The Hague. The final vote at the Rome Conference was the result of a long process that had started with the Nuremberg Military Trials against those most repsonsible for the Nazi atrocities committed during the Second World War. With the words of the prosecutor of the IG-Farben trial, Joshua DuBois, the idea behind the trials was that ‘It will not be possible to re-establish a healthy and peaceful European community by simply covering the dead with a shroud without any investigation.’

The idea that prosecuting atrocities committed in wars is in some way important for achieving peace after conflict is an idea that has been around ever since. But, for a long time it remained only an idea. The Cold War balance of power precluded any compromise on establishing an international organisation with the competence to judge crimes committed on an international level. But after the collapse of the Soviet Union this idea took a tangible shape and was finally passed through the Rome Statute, laying the foundation for the ICC in 1998. The 60 necessary ratifications of the Rome Statute to trigger its entry into force were gathered with exceptional speed, so the ICC could start its work in 2002 already.

Europe and Latin America are two of the main supporters of the court. As the ICC has no police force, it is heaily dependent on such state support and cooperation to do its work. The first eight years have seen a slow start of the court's work, with only three of thirteen prosecuted persons in custody and a polemic discussion about the courts role in the scope of an arrest warrant issued for the Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir.

From May 31 to June 11 2010 the court's work was assessed during the Rome Statute Review Conference in Kampala, the capital of Uganda. The Review Conference had been planned since the Rome Conference and apart from assessing the court's work so far, amendments to the Rome Statute were discussed in Kampala. The three major amendments that were discussed at the conference were the deletion of art. 124, giving the states parties to the treaty the right to exclude the ICC's jurisdiction on war crimes for seven years in their territory (the article was not deleted); the amendment of art. 8, penalising the use of weapons like poison, chemicals and hollow-tip projectiles in internal conflicts (the amendment was passed) and most importantly the definition of the crime of aggression.

So far the ICC has jurisdiciton over war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. The crime of aggression, meaning the penalisation of a breach of the UN Charter through an armed attack, was also included in the Rome Statute, but the ICC's jurisdiction for the crime was pending a clear definition. A definition that was now reached at the Kampala Conference. Unlike to many other international conferences, the results of the Kampala conference were not clear from the start. Usually results are agreed months before the actual starting date of the conference between the delegations of the states involved. Nevertheless, the definiton of the crime of aggression and the different trigger mechanisms discussed in Kampala remained contested until the last minute.

Many countries, especially the African states parties and the UNASUR, were in favour of implementing the crime of aggression. But one central question remained: Would the UN Security Council trigger the jurisdiction of the ICC or would a Chamber of the ICC decide whether the Office of the Prosecutor could start an investigation in a case. The UN Security Council already has the power to refer cases to the ICC and defer them for 12 months if the council deems it necessary. The referal of the situation in Darfur (Sudan) was the first time the UN Security Council made use of this powers and sparked a controversy in doing so.

Many African states and NGOs are claiming that the ICC is following purely political motivations and is a neo-colonialist institution since there are so far only active investigations in Africa. Even though the ICC is also conducting preliminary investigations in Afghanisatan, Gaza, Georgia and Colombia, the UN Security Council referal has strengthened this perception among many critics of the ICC.

Thus many countries were opposed to giving the UN Security Council a role in deciding whether the crime of aggression has been triggered in a particular case. Since the Council decisons are politically biased due to the veto powers of the five permanent members, a stronger UN Security Council role automatically means a more politicised court.

The compromise reached im Kampala allows state parties to decide whether the court may act on the crime of aggression. It can only do so, where either the UN Security Council refers a matter to the ICC or the alleged aggressor and victim states are parties to the ICC treaty though. How this will play out in practice remains to be seen in the future. Since the ICC jurisdiction for the crime of aggression will come into force in 2017 earliest, we will probably have to wait for a while to see the results.

A positive result of the conference was that the UN Security Council was not chosen as the only trigger for the crime of aggression, a step that would have further politicised the court. Europe and Latin America have been two of the main blocks securing that the ICC remains an independent institution governed by legal decisions and not by political calculations.

Implementig Intergenerational Justice

Last week, a colleague of mine, Marisa dos Reis, organised an international scientific conference on the legal implementation of the rights of future generations on the premises of the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation in Lisbon, Portugal. It was the perfect excuse to put the doctoral thesis beside for a moment and board a plane to (reputedly) warmer regions. We had some bad luck with the weather, but let me get to the point of this posting.

There are a host of contemporary problems that directly affect today's children and tomorrows yet unborn people. They include the global financial and economic crisis, the depletion of natural resources, environmental degradation, conflicts and most notably global climate change. Most of these problems were not heard of only a hundred years ago. Of course there have always been financial and economic crises (1920's!) but until recently humankind just didn't have the technological means to alter our environment in a way that shapes the fate of generations to come. Even if the old Greeks or the Holy Roman Empire would have wanted to, they could not have destroyed or severly damaged the environment in a way that would have affected generations born 100 years later. Even the forest clearance on the Iberian Peninsula, one of the most obvious historical examples for human influence on the environment, was done in the course of many generations. Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans, Portuguese and Spaniards cut the trees down in the course of the centuries to build their fleets, creating the arid climate on the peninsula we know today. But our generation can wipe out the world in a blink of the eye with nuclear weapons.

The problems are thus more pressing than ever. Yet, future generations are difficult to protect against damages through law. This is true even if they are caused knowingly through massive neglect as is undoubtedly the case with climate change. Unborn people do not have legal standing in the traditional sense. Additionally, laws stretching far into the future might clash with the principles of the rule of law, most notably the principle of clarity. But still, politicians on national and international levels always refer to future generations, their rights and the need to protect them. Are these only phrases? Future generations and their rights are named in the preambles of the UN Charter and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. They are mentioned by the Brundtland Commission, by the Stockholm Declaration on the Environment, by the Rio Declaration in 1992 and the UNESCO Decleration on the Responsibilities of the Present Generations towards Future Generations, to name just a few.

So, apart from visiting beautiful Lisbon, it's restaurants and bars and the marvelous towns in the vincinity (Cascais and Sintra a really worth a visit), there was a major question to deal with. The objective of the conference was to elaborate whether the numerous declarations of safeguarding the rights of future generations can be put into practice despite the problems they confront legal practitioners with. International speakers from the fields of philosophy and all sub-fields of law came together in Lisbon to discuss possible ways of implementing these rights on the national, European and international levels.
Many interesting approaches were intorduced at the conference. Emilie Gaillard Sebileau from the University of Orléans presented possibilities how the problem of rights of future people could be solved in French national law. Lucy Stone from UNICEF UK explained how safeguarding children's rights may be a feasible approach to protect the rights of future generations. Maja Göpel from the World Future Council presented a possibility of including the rights of future generations in the Lisbon Treaty of the EU and Sebastien Jodoin from the Centre for International Sustainable Development Law presented a draft code of criminal law addressing crimes against future generations. These speakers are of course just a small selection. The current Ombudsman for Future Generations of the Hungarian Parliament, Sandor Fülop, and the former Ombudsman from the Israeli Knesset, Schlomo Shoham, gave valuable insights into the work of institutions established to protect the interests of future generations. A full participant list of the conference can be found on the website.

The results of the conference will be documented in the scope of the Intergenerational Justice Review of the Foundation for the Rights of Future Generations. The journal is accessible freely and will be published by the beginning of July on the homepage of the foundation.

Thanks for reading!

Comment on the General Elections in the UK

These days I think back a lot to my stay in Leicester, a middle-sized town in the English East-Midlands, right around the corner of Nottingham and Robin Hood's famous Sherwood Forest. I stayed there in 2005/2006 for an Erasmus term. The elections for the German Bundestag took place just a couple of days before I caught my coach to England.

I vividly remember how many other Erasmus students and especially my English co-students in the different seminars asked us Germans what was going on in Germany and how it could be possible that the politicians were not able to form a government for weeks.
The social democrat chancellor of Germany, Gerhard Schröder, had triggered a snap election after losing a couple of important regions to the conservatives. Surprisingly the conservatives did not manage to achieve a clear victory despite the low popularity of the SPD government.

Chancellor Schroeder's appearance on election day has become famous for his psyched behaviour bordering on straight arrogance and many people were wondering if he was actually intoxicated. Long story short: Schroeder refused to step down to make a grand coalition under a chancellor Merkel possible and a political deadlock froze the Federal Republic for many weeks until Schroeder finally gave up and a CDU/SPD coalition could start its work.

In Leicester, we were talking a lot about the advantages and disadvantages of the British style first-past-the-post system and the German system of proportional representation at that time. Most people (including myself) considered it an advantage of the first-past-the-post system, that there was a very low danger of a hung parliament or a blockade like in Germany in 2005.

The General Elections in the UK on May 6th have now proven that this is not necessarily true. The majority of the British citizens are tired of Labour (at least according to 90% of all newspaper articles that I have read on the topic). But their voters are a more coherent group and have a higher regional concentration than those of the Tories or the LibDems, which means that with first-past-the-post even a hugely unpopular government has a chance to cling to power. Even though Labour is the main loser of the general elections, it is not clear yet if Tories and LibDems will be able to get to a coalition agreement, especially since David Cameron apparently does not even want to talk about the LibDems' main demand of reforming the electoral system of the UK.

Regardless of the outcome, the UK case illustrates a worrisome tendency: Not even a first-past-the-post system can apparently stop the decay of the large catch-all parties in Europe. In France, the political left is in hopeless disarray, much the same can be said for Italy. The big German parties are increasingly dependent on three-party coalitions in order to form a government in the German Länder, a trend that seems to be reinforced by the results of the elections in North Rhine-Westfalia today. Of course the LibDems benefited from the youthful charisma of their leader Nick Clegg and the frustration after the long Labour years. The only safe thing to say is that the negotiations about who will take power for the next couple of years in the UK will be interesting to watch. If the Tories fail to win the LibDems over, we could even witness Gordon Brown's comeback. The effects of this historical result on the first-past-the-post system is the second big question mark that will be answered within the next few days.