Comment on the General Elections in the UK

These days I think back a lot to my stay in Leicester, a middle-sized town in the English East-Midlands, right around the corner of Nottingham and Robin Hood's famous Sherwood Forest. I stayed there in 2005/2006 for an Erasmus term. The elections for the German Bundestag took place just a couple of days before I caught my coach to England.

I vividly remember how many other Erasmus students and especially my English co-students in the different seminars asked us Germans what was going on in Germany and how it could be possible that the politicians were not able to form a government for weeks.
The social democrat chancellor of Germany, Gerhard Schröder, had triggered a snap election after losing a couple of important regions to the conservatives. Surprisingly the conservatives did not manage to achieve a clear victory despite the low popularity of the SPD government.

Chancellor Schroeder's appearance on election day has become famous for his psyched behaviour bordering on straight arrogance and many people were wondering if he was actually intoxicated. Long story short: Schroeder refused to step down to make a grand coalition under a chancellor Merkel possible and a political deadlock froze the Federal Republic for many weeks until Schroeder finally gave up and a CDU/SPD coalition could start its work.

In Leicester, we were talking a lot about the advantages and disadvantages of the British style first-past-the-post system and the German system of proportional representation at that time. Most people (including myself) considered it an advantage of the first-past-the-post system, that there was a very low danger of a hung parliament or a blockade like in Germany in 2005.

The General Elections in the UK on May 6th have now proven that this is not necessarily true. The majority of the British citizens are tired of Labour (at least according to 90% of all newspaper articles that I have read on the topic). But their voters are a more coherent group and have a higher regional concentration than those of the Tories or the LibDems, which means that with first-past-the-post even a hugely unpopular government has a chance to cling to power. Even though Labour is the main loser of the general elections, it is not clear yet if Tories and LibDems will be able to get to a coalition agreement, especially since David Cameron apparently does not even want to talk about the LibDems' main demand of reforming the electoral system of the UK.

Regardless of the outcome, the UK case illustrates a worrisome tendency: Not even a first-past-the-post system can apparently stop the decay of the large catch-all parties in Europe. In France, the political left is in hopeless disarray, much the same can be said for Italy. The big German parties are increasingly dependent on three-party coalitions in order to form a government in the German Länder, a trend that seems to be reinforced by the results of the elections in North Rhine-Westfalia today. Of course the LibDems benefited from the youthful charisma of their leader Nick Clegg and the frustration after the long Labour years. The only safe thing to say is that the negotiations about who will take power for the next couple of years in the UK will be interesting to watch. If the Tories fail to win the LibDems over, we could even witness Gordon Brown's comeback. The effects of this historical result on the first-past-the-post system is the second big question mark that will be answered within the next few days.

Argentina and the case of Baltasar Garzón

Baltasar Garzón is probably the internationally best known judge working on a national level. The Spanish judge was born in Torres de Albánchez in the Province of Jaén in Andalusia. After a side trip into politics in 1993, when he ran for the Spanish parliament on the list of the left PSOE party, he quickly dedicated himself to his career as a judge. Baltasar Garzón is currently the examining magistrate of the Juzgado Central de Instrucción No. 5 of Spain’s Central Criminal Court, the Audiencia Nacional. In this position he is in charge of judging Spain’s most important criminal cases.

Baltasar Garzón is considered one of the most active judges in using the principle of universal law and was one of the driving forces that constituted Spain's role as the nation with one of the widest interpretations of universal jurisdiction worldwide*. He is probably best known for issuing an international arrest warrant against the former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet who had previously profited from a life-long amnesty as a member of the Chilean senate. The arrest warrant was eventually enforced by the United Kingdom but extradition to Spain was denied on health grounds.

Baltasar Garzón also tried to lift Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi's immunity from prosecution at the Council of Europe in April 2001 and repeatedly expressed a desire to investigate the involvement of the former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in the killings of leftist opposition figures in the Southern Cone in 1975, known as Operation Condor. Additionally he opened investigations on systematic torture in the cases of former prisoners at the US military prison in Guantanamo Bay.
It is rather obvious that Garzón has a knack for taking up spectacular and sensational cases, an approach that is not beyond criticism for a judge who should act on purely legal considerations. Nevertheless his actions in strengthening universal law highlighted cases of impunity and furthered the notion of the primacy of the rule of law worldwide.

But Baltasar Garzón is also an inconvenient judge on the national level. With his investigations into the party financing of the Spanish Conservative Party, the Partido Popular (PP), and against a PSOE minister involved in creating death squads to fight the ETA terrorist organisation between 1983 and 1987, he has made himself enemies in both political camps. This fact is currently backfiring on him as he has come under fire for allegedly exceeding his authorities in the scope of an investigation.

Baltasar Garzón started investigating the crimes of the Franco regime during the dictatorship even though an amnesty was democratically passed in 1977. Three organisations, including the radical right wing party Falange, have sued him for perversion of justice. The Spanish High Court has opened the trial against him and the administrative body of the Spanish judges will decide on Thursday if Garzón will be stripped from his office. Scores of Spanish victim's and civil society organisations, including film stars and directors like Pedro Almódovar, are protesting against the proceedings.

It is an obvious scandal that right-wing parties can not only fend off investigations into crimes committed during the dictatorship but even put the judges investigating these crimes under pressure. Internationally the acceptance for amnesties is rapidly diminishing, a development emphasized by the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Rome Statute, establishing the ICC, has already been signed by over 110 states with obvious repercussions on the validity of amnesties covering war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocides. Passing the 1977 amnesty would be all but impossible nowadays. An amnesty could only be possible if concrete steps to investigate the crimes are taken and the truth is brought into the open. Those directly responsible for the crimes could not completely evade punishment and the victim's rights would receive considerably more attention today.

In an ironical twist of history, the Argentinean attorney Carlos Slepoy has now declared that he will apply for taking up criminal proceedings in connection to crimes against humanity or even genocide committed by the Franco regime. Ironically, Garzón himself had started investigations against Argentinean Junta leaders in the past, thus contributing to their amnesty being revoked. Now it is possible that we will witness the first case in which Argentina applies the principle of universal jurisdiction itself, another indicator that the relation between Europe and Latin America is changing. Latin America's democracies are sufficiently self-confident today to teach European states a lesson in respecting victim's rights, a thought that will surely cost some Europeans to adapt to.

A victim's organisation has started a collection of signatures against the indictment of Baltasar Garzón at http://www.afeco.org/

*Even though the use of universal jurisdiction has increasingly been limited due to the political fallout of the cases. The criteria for the cases having a direct relevancy for Spain have been strengthened, reason for the failure of the attempt to start investigations into the Operation Cast Lead of the Israeli Defence Force in Gaza by the end of 2008 in Spain.

What Europe and Latin America can learn from each other

In 2010 many Latin American states are celebrating their 200 years of independence anniversaries, called 'bicentenario' in Spanish. Chile, Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia are preparing their respective celebrations with growing enthusiasm. In Mexico there will be a soccer tournament to celebrate independence and Colombia sports its own 'bicentenario' hymn. The celebrations also mark a point in history at which the relations between Latin America and Europe were transformed in a decisive way. Simon Bolívar, Francisco de Miranda in Venezuela and Miguel Hidalgo in Mexico, to name a few, all played their part in liberating Latin America from Spanish domination from 1810 onwards. Nevertheless the independence wars were mainly an elite revolution fought by the influential criollos (people of mixed Spanish and indigenous descent) for their own liberty. They did not bring liberty to the indigenous people of Latin America who were still considered of lower social status by the criollos.
The accumulation of independence anniversaries in 2010 is a welcome opportunity to have a look at how Europe and Latin America have fared since the former Spanish colonies gained their right to self-determination.

Europe has witnessed a fundamental transformation during the last 200 years. The ideas of the French revolution were still fresh and the consecutive waves of change were still rippling the political framework of the 'old continent'. The reality of Europe was still dominated by powerful nation states engaged in antagonistic relations and competing for influence within and outside of Europe. Balance of power politics and changing allegiances, accompanied by regular outbursts of war, shaped the relations between Europe's nations.

Today, the continent has grown together politically and economically in the scope of the European Communities. Only small patches of the continent remain outside the Union, either out of their own choice (Switzerland, Norway) or because they are not yet fulfilling the criteria for acceptance as Member States. While non-EU states like Switzerland and Norway are politically and economically integrated despite lacking membership, states like Croatia and Serbia are on their way towards accession.
But political crises like the fallout of the financial and economic crisis show that the cultural differences between European countries remain and sometimes lead to quarrels and misunderstandings. Germans are complaining about the mentality of sloppy accounting of southern Member States like Greece and do not want to pay other people's bills. France is pointing at German selfishness when addressing the growth of the German economy bought at the cost of wage sacrifice and the competitiveness of neighbouring economies.
Every European who has lived for some time in another Member State or has family in another European country has made his experiences with cultural differences. Most of the time these encounters are enriching experiences, opening our eyes for different cultural contexts. But sometimes it is frightening to see how easy it is to be misunderstood when out of one's own cultural context. Add to this mix of European cultures the cultures of the migrant groups living in many European cities and you have a huge variety of different cultural backgrounds crammed together on a relatively small continent. It is probably not surprising that the cultural cohabitation between Europeans of different nationality and migrants from different origins does still not run smoothly.

Latin America on the other hand is still in the process of economical and political cohesion. The difficulties in covering the large distances between Latin American states (intracontinental plane flights are not affordable for a large portion of the population) and the pervasiveness of political conflicts between them are a clear indicator for this. Even though Latin American integration is advancing, there is still a very long way to go. Culturally, on the other hand, Latin America is a remarkable example for a unique continent-wide culture including African, European and Latin American roots. Nobody who has read books by authors from different Latin American countries can deny the closeness in style and the same cultural roots of, say, Colombia's Gabriel García Marquez and Uruguay's Juan Carlos Onetti. The continent shares a common Iberian linguistic heritage, defying the trend of accepting English as the global 'lingua franca'. And the mix of cultures to be found on the continent is a herald of things to come with the advancing globalization. The strength Latin America can draw from its rich cultural heritage in the globalized world of tomorrow is considerable.

On a shrinking planet, the political, economical and cultural cohesion of regions is key for ensuring their influence on a global scale. While Europe has advanced on the political and economical level, it has a lot to learn from cultural cohesion in Latin America. The mix of cultures that respects African, European and indigenous roots could be a blueprint for a culturally unified Europe that does not overwrite its unique and diverse cultures by some kind of standardized culture, but produces a synthesis that is larger than the sum of it's parts. Growing together on a cultural level does not imply to lose the respect for the cultural roots of the different Member States. Latin America is the living example for this.

The Falkland/Malvinas case

The United Kingdom and Argentine are upholding a conflict about the status of a small group of islands in the South Atlantic since decades. Even the name of the islands, consisting of two large and several smaller ones, is contested. The British name is Falkland Islands while they are called las Malvinas in Argentine. Both the British and the Argentinian government claim the islands to be part of their territory. While Argentine sees them as an integral part of their Tierra del Fuego Province, Britain maintains their status as British dependent territory. The Argentinian claim is even included in transitional provisions of its constitution.

The contested islands look back at a changing history of rivaling claims. The British first landed on the islands in 1690. France claimed de facto control over the islands by founding a settlement in 1764. The 1713 Treaty of Utrecht conceded control of the islands to Spain, which lead to the expulsion of French and British settlers from the islands by 1770. The Argentinians first claimed sovereignity over the islands in 1820 after it's independence from Spain. Argentina was still known as the United Provinces of the River Plate Since at that time. Since 1833 there is a fully fledged British colony on the islands. The population of the islands sees itself as British, but Argentine declines their claims for self-determination, stating that the original (Argentinian) population has been expelled by British colonists who thus do not have a genuine right to self-determination.

The conflicting claims from Britain and Argentine first led to real tensions during the Falklands War / Guerra de las Malvinas in 1982. The Argentinian military junta used the claim for the islands as a vent for the growing discontent of the population with the military government. These claims quickly culminated in an Argentinian invasion of the islands in 1982. Contrary to Argentinian expectations, the United Kingdom under Margret Thatcher reacted quickly and sent a naval force to retake the islands. The resulting conflict lasted 76 days and cost the lives of 1000 soldiers and a handful of civilians and ended with the British reposession of the islands. The loss of the islands led to the toppling of the military junta that had originally triggered the conflict to consolidate it's rule.

Argentinian claims for the islands have never since been secluded and have been renewed in 1994, 2009 and 2010. The recent discovery of oil in the sea around the islands has led to new tensions in February 2010. While British companies began preparing the extraction of the oil, supposed to start in 2011, Argentinian President Christina Kirchner declared that Argentine is taking control of all shipping between its coast and the islands in order to hamper the exploitation of the oil field. While there are voices in the international (especially the British) press, saying that President Kirchner is using the Argentinian claim for the islands as a vent for discontent with her government, just like the military junta in 1982, Argentinians are taking the claims as a serious issue of national identity.

A suitable first step to defuse the conflict would be an agreement between the British and Argentinian governments to exploit the oil fields in a joint operation and share the profits. Economical cooperation could then help to unravel the highly symbolical issues that have proctracted the conflict. A conflict between two of the largest and most important states of Europe and Latin America can be a monkey wrench thrown into the process of deeper cooperation between the two continents and it is questionable if a group of remote islands are really worth the price to pay.

A sign on the Argentinian side of its border with Brazil,
proclaiming the Argentinian claim for the islands

Germany's blind spot: Latin America

At the beginning of the year, I wrote a post about Europe's foreign policy vis-à-vis Latin America with hopes for a boost of the relationship due to the Spanish EU presidency. Unfortunately, near state bancruptcies in some European Member States, tragic earthquakes in Haiti, Chile and Turkey as well as a dispute about the creation of the new European foreign service have tied up the EU's resources and a real breakthrough for the EU-Latin American relations is not in sight.

Meanwhile, Latin America has once more underscored its objective of leaving the US-American 'backyard' and becoming an independent region having an important word in global relations with the founding of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CALC) in February 2010. The organization includes all Organization of the American States (OAS) members but USA and Canada, which is a clear signal towards more independence of the region.

Some Member States of the EU have understood that Latin America will be a key region in the future and have intensified their economic ties in the region instead of waiting for a coordinated EU approach towards Latin America. France winds up arms deals with Brasília, supplying a nuclear-powered submarine and probably Rafale fighters. At the same time Paris is courting Bolivia in order to gain access to the large Lithium deposits in the Uyuni salt lake. Non-EU states, like China, are pushing their economic relations with Latin America with even more force. China has become the number one trade partner of several countries in the region. Germany, on the other hand, has slept through most of the Latin American boom.

Companies from Spain, Portugal and Italy seized the moment when Brazil privatized its telecommunication market in the 90's and invested in the growing market that has gained considerable importance now. The Spanish Santander Consumer Bank is another good example for European companies that have seized their window of opportunity in Latin America. In Santander's rise to becoming a global player in the financial sector, it's early investments in the Brazilian banking sector play a crucial role. German companies did not even have a spectator role in all these developments, also a consequence of Germany's foreign policy that focused on India and China while practically ignoring Brazil. When Angela Merkel visited Brazil for the first and only time yet, she stayed for one and a half days, a bad joke considering the size of Brazil. Additionally it took the German government five months to name a new ambassador for Brazil. The downfall of German interests in Latin America is apparant, especially in comparison to the Interwar Years when 'Made in Germany' became a guarantee for quality in Latin America.

Against this background, it should be seen as a positive sign that Germany's new foreign minister, Guido Westerwelle, has declared Latin America one of his main areas of interest. There is definetly enough ground to be recovered for German foreign policy in Latin America to keep a foreign minister busy for a term or two. As a kick-off visit for his new Latin America strategy he visited Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil for five days. Unfortunately, German media's discussion of Mr. Westerwelle's trip mostly focused on one issue: the composition of his fellow travelers. His companion, Michael Mronz, is already an inherent part of his travels abroad. In the case of Brazil, which will soon host the Olympics and the Soccer World Cup, German news media see a commingling of private and professional interests on part of Mr. Westerwelle since his significant other is an event manager. There are speculations that Mr. Mronz used the trip to meet potential business partners on-site. Other members of Westerwelle's business delegation have been linked to himself and his brother, leading to further accusations of Westerwelle not respecting the red lines of his office.
One can only hope that this political discussion will not be the only public reaction to the foreign ministers first trip to Latin America. After all there were five days of talks with high government representatives in Latin America. The results of these talks should receive their fair share of attention in the national media. This is important for fostering the ties between civil society representatives so important in contemporary foreign politics.

Social benefits discussion revisited

Nearly one month ago I wrote a posting on our societal approach towards poverty, addressing the discussion of social benefits in German newspapers, especially a philosophical discussion in German feuilletons. Already some German right wing politicians were attacking the social consensus on welfare that had developed in Europe during decades.

Now, the German constitutional court recently delivered a judgement on the basis for calculating the social benefits. The judges reasoned that this basis is intransparent and does not take all the cost that incur in everyday life into consideration. This was not a judgement calling for a rise of social benefits, but for an overhaul of the basis for calculation. Theoretically even cuts would be possible as a reaction to the ruling, but in some areas the court deemed it obvious that benefits were too low. This especially applies to the rates for children. So far the needs of children have been calculated as a 60% of adult needs, which is obviously nonsense.

Furthering children and ensuring that they have the possibility to obtain an appropriate education can be very costly. Paying for private tutors, schoolbooks, private lessons for the piano or dancing lessons can easily add up to a monthly sum much superior to what an adult needs in the same period. And this does not even include spendings for clothes. Especially young children and teens need a lot of clothes simply due to the fact that they are growing rapidly.

But instead of triggering a discussion of how we can ensure that the poorest of our society can meet their needs and how to avoid that children growing up in poverty will automatically fail to advance in our educational system, the liberal party immediately started a discussion about the worth of labour in the German society. The discussion was spearheaded by the German foreing secretary and vice-chancellor Guido Westerwelle. After 100 days travelling across the globe and showing a reasonable diplomatic performance many Germans had already forgotten that the leader of the German liberal party was not only capable of a diplomatic demeanor but was also one of the loudest demagogues of the country. Now he has reentered the domestic political stage with a bang.

According to Westerwelle, Germany is approaching socialism and "late roman decadence" because people who do not work are leading lives in "wealth", earning more money than people who are working. Well, there is some truth in his claims. Some people work 8 to 10 hour shifts to earn a wage barely surpassing social benefit levels, but decadence is hardly the word for people struggling to get along with about 380 euros per month. Especially in times in which bankers, whose irresponsible gambling cost society a fortune, lose their jobs well endowed with a "golden parachute" or are even looking forward to record bonuses at the end of 2010. Westerwelle is demanding that the weak should be protected from the resourceful and sluggish. According to him, everybody is talking about the recipients of tax money while forgetting about those who pay taxes. 

What he does not realize is that the current asymmetry between social benefits and low wages might as well be a consequence of the increasing pressure on wages and the wage sacrifices of German workers and not following from immorally high social benefits. We do need a discussion about the worth of labour in our society, but from a completely different angle than Westerwelle is suggesting.

The Euro dilemma

Newspapers have been full of the potential bankrupcy of the Greek state lately. And financial analysts and newsmedia were quick to name the potential future candidates for state bankrupcy when the creditworthiness rating of Greece was lowered. Usually Portugal and Spain are listed first, followed by Ireland and Italy. Many commentators even go as far as seeing the whole Euro currency close to collapse. Having a closer look at the context of the latest developments on the financial markets, it becomes obvious quickly that the situation is not as severe as often suggested, but one will also soon discover the inherent flaws of the Euro system and the major dilemma that EU leaders now confront. From a Latin American perspective these developments are doubly interesting.

First and foremost because Latin America is aspiring to step into the footsteps of the European Union with it's UNASUR project. Since UNASUR is mainly driven by economical and financial integration, like the EU in it's early stages, there are valuable lessons to be learned from Eruope's approach to a common market and currency. This holds even if a common currency on the South American continent may be years or decades away or may even never come.

Secondly, it will be certainly interesting for Latin American states to see, how European states cope with rising debts and dangers of bankrupcy in comparison to, say, the Argentinian approach that tackled bankrupcy aggressively by ceasing the payment of debts in 2001. A decision that eased the pressure on the country's economy and financial system but came at the price that Argentina has still trouble to stock up on money on the world financial market.

Looking at the situation in Europe the figures in question have to be put into perspective first. Greece announced new debts summing up to 12,7 percent of the GDP for 2009, raising its total debt to 120 percent of the GDP. The old government had calculated with a 3,7 percent of new debts, a figure that was nearly quadripled when the new government stopped massaging the figures after years of 'creative' financial accounting. Portugal has debts summing up to around 77 percent of the GDP, Spain and Ireland are at about 50 percent. Spain incurs new debts of about 6 percent, Ireland 11 percent. The EU covenant for financial stability dictates a cap of 3 percent for new indebtedness and 60 percent for the total debt. At first glance these figures look dramatic, and in the case of Greece we certainly have to talk about an alarming situation since this development has been going on for years. Greece's total debt is massive and growing quickly. Speculations on the financial market concerning a possible bankrupcy and quick reactions of the other EU states are thus understandable. But the figures of the other states named as candidates for bankrupcy have to be read more carefully.

States that traditionally had a soft currency, like Spain, Portugal , Italy and also Greece, had higher debt levels and higher levels of new indebtedness in the past. For these countries higher debts have been normal for decades since they could be countered by inflation. And the high velocity with which debts are rising right now can be attributed to the world economic crisis, especially in the cases of Spain and Ireland.

But the figures hide a more fundamental dilemma. In the past the states were solely responsible for their own debts, meaning that they could also manage them with inflation. An exit now blocked by the EU criteria for financial stability. While the financial leeway has been restricted to a certain degree by the EU Commission, financial and economic policies still remain largely in the hands of the national governments. This means that EU Member States having the Euro are following different financial and economic approaches. They are profiting from the financial stability of the euro area which in some cases led to a blockade of economic reform since the need was not obvious in times of economic growth. Other states, like Germany, went through a cycle of economic reforms meanwhile, leading to wage sacrifice on a large scale. Germany thus gained a competitive edge in comparison to other EU states that experienced pay raises unheard-of in their recent history and are now paying the price in times of economic stagnation. They are not equiped to fare well on a global shrinking and increasingly competitive market. Thus, in a way, Germany is partly responsible for the debt situation in other Euro countries since it gained an edge against its European competitors.

Sharing a currency and a market without sharing financial and economic policies has led to this dicrepancy that is now endangering the finances of some member states. Should states like Greece fail to balance its budget, Europe will have to take the unpleasant decision to either help states like Greece and reward economically irresponsible behaviour or face growing doubts about the financial and economic stability of the EU and possibly even a new crisis stemming from the bankrupcy of EU Member States. There is still reasonable hope that Greece will be able to control it's problem on it's own by implementing strict savings schemes monitored by the EU Commission. The heads of the EU Member States declared their confidence in the Greek plans yesterday. But demonstrations in Greece against inevitable cutbacks show that things could become difficult. The demonstrations and the fact that Greece has an impressive record of tax evasion aliment suspicions that many Greek are not ready to pay for an efficient state but are expecting their fellow EU citizens to pay their bills.

The lesson Latin America can learn from these developments for it's own ongoing process of integration is to think twice if it is a wise move to share a currency without sharing economic and financial policies.